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Infancia y eternidad: sobre la pedagogía trágica de Miguel de Unamuno
RESUMEN1
En el presente artículo se pretende describir las líneas básicas de lo que Unamuno consideró 
como una pedagogía adecuada para que el niño disfrute de una infancia genuina y larga, lo cual 
facilitará que se convierta en un hombre de intensa vida interior y gran valor histórico siempre 
y cuando dicha infancia siga próxima a su corazón. Para mostrar más claramente en qué consiste una 
pedagogía adecuada para Unamuno, se explicará también por qué consideró una excesiva sumisión 
a la pedagogía cientíica como perniciosa para el desarrollo de los niños.
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INTRODUCTION
A irst approach to Miguel de Unamuno’s work may be suficient to convince 
the reader that this Basque philosopher, playwright and poet did not write about 
children but about adults and for adults. Furthermore, the addressee of Unamuno’s 
work seems to be not a simple adult but a reader sensitive to the painful existential 
conlicts which Unamuno relects in his writings. Of course, there is occasion for 
discussing if religious faith inspires Unamuno’s work − as Alvar [1961], Marías 
[1971] and Ferrater [1985] among others maintain – or if he tries to cover up his 
atheism with a disconcerting confusion of ideas and words – as some authors like 
Manyá [1960], Cancela [1972] and above all Sánchez Barbudo [1968] pointed out. 
 
1  This paper has been written within the research project “Normativity and Praxis: The Cur-
rent Debate After Wittgenstein” (FFI2010-15975).





Yet leaving this debate aside, it is clear that if existential conlicts are considered 
as lacking in philosophical relevance, as is proper of current analytic philosophy, 
the interest that Unamuno’s work may awaken will be reduced to the ield of 
literature. Precisely because Unamuno is dealing with existential conlicts, he ad-
dresses to the actual person, the lesh-and-blood person who is already suffering 
from the craving for personal immortality, but also to the individual who still has 
not experienced such craving even though he is expected to feel it because of his 
age and his alleged maturity. As we will see later, Unamuno excludes the child 
“from the issue of death and immortality” [RNM, p. 54]2, for he still does not 
understand what death is although he hears a lot about it. Since children are not 
yet aware that they will die, they cannot experience existential conlicts related 
to the craving for immortality. However, this does not mean at all that there is no 
room in Unamuno’s work for the child, the childhood and even the childishness. 
Far from it, Unamuno regards his book Recuerdos de niñez y de mocedad as the 
sweetest and the most loving of his works: and curiously enough, he says about 
this “poor little Cinderella” that it became “a kind of essay on child psychology 
and pedagogy” [APJ, p. 88]. It is noteworthy that Unamuno describes in this way 
a work so important to him. Indeed, Unamuno recalls in this autobiographical 
account some events of his childhood not only to evoke the serenity and the purity 
characteristic of children’s intuition through which true freedom can be reached 
[cfr. RNM, p. 129], but also to illustrate which feelings and experiences should 
be provided by families and pedagogues responsible for children’s education and 
development. The pedagogy Unamuno recommends is shown in his Recuerdos 
de niñez y de mocedad only through examples, yet it is more clearly illustrated in 
two other works. On the one hand, it is negatively characterized in Amor y peda-
gogía, a novel which sourly caricatures the deiciencies of scientiic and positivist 
pedagogy; on the other hand, it is positively characterized in a series of articles in 
which Unamuno analyzes the advantages for the child of having a long childhood 
which, besides being gladdened with spontaneous games − although they might 
perhaps seem pointless – is free of attempts to turn the child at an early stage into 
a faithful servant of logic and rational thinking.
My aim in producing this work is to show which defects Unamuno attributes 
to scientiic pedagogy and, at the same time, to show which conditions must be 
fulilled for the child to enjoy an a pp rop r i a t e  childhood. To better understand 
in which an ‘appropriate’ childhood within the context of Unamuno’s work con-
sists on, I will explain the main lines of the pedagogy Unamuno recommended as 
well as of the pedagogy he criticized, as a result of which it will be easier to better 
understand the role and relevance of the child, and by extension of childhood 
itself, in Unamuno’s work.
2  Quotations from Unamuno’s work have been translated into English by José María Ariso.
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TRAGIC PEDAGOGY OR THE TRAGEDY OF PEDAGOGY
Whenever Unamuno turns his gaze on his own childhood, he shows a nostal-
gic attitude proper to one who thinks longingly of a lost paradise. Yet this thought 
goes far beyond the fond memory of distant times: what Unamuno misses is the 
life of the child who “appropriates the world by losing himself in it” [RNM, 
p. 126]. At irst sight, Unamuno might appear to refer here to a precocious child 
who even from an early age fantasizes that his own reasoning allows him to ap-
prehend the essence of things and of the world itself. Yet that is just the opposite 
of what he actually means. To be precise, he praises the child who puts heart and 
soul into playing spontaneously without trying to reveal any truth:
And maybe there is no deeper conception of life than kid’s intuition, who, by ixing his eyes 
in the clothes of things without trying to strip them, sees everything that is hidden by things, for 
things conceal nothing at all; then he feels the total and eternal mystery, which is the clearest light. 
[RNM, p. 128]
Unamuno also recalls fondly those days of his childhood in which he and his 
playmates returned home sweaty and covered with bruises, but with their eyes full 
of life: “By opening our eyesight to the beauty of the bark of things, and closing 
the soul to the sadness of their core, we went to sleep as only saints and kids can 
sleep” [RNM, p. 26].
In this vein, his friend José Ortega y Gasset (2008) stated some years later 
that, while it is true that nearly all great philosophies assumed that things conceal 
a hidden essence which must be revealed by man, there is no reason why man has 
to carry out such a task. Yet whilst Ortega added that it is man who must invent 
a being for things, Unamuno concentrates on the issue of eternity, for example 
when he points out that “only by preserving an eternal childhood […] can one 
reach true freedom and look at the mystery of life face to face” [RNM, p. 129]. 
Indeed, Unamuno admits that, when he evokes his childhood, realizes that he and 
his playmates felt then “confusingly in the depth of their souls the interrelatedness 
of everything” [RNM, p. 35]. Just as the adult is sure not only that the prairie in 
which he is at a given moment is only one among the many prairies that exist, 
but also that those prairies are countless and different from one another, for the 
young Unamuno and his playmates the prairie was only and exclusively that in 
which they ran [RNM, p. 35]. The whole world was condensed for them in each 
instant of frenzy, in each instant they were in the grip of the hubbub of the game. 
At this stage it may be objected that adults can also enjoy such feeling if the right 
circumstances occur; yet what Unamuno wishes to highlight, however, is that this 
pleasure will be often experienced by the adult if he had a long childhood full of 
games and illusions. That is why Unamuno states that the man of intense interior 
life and great historical value is characterized because his childhood is still very 





close to his heart [cf. SN, p. 120]. Since this man did not seek to be relected in 
other people but joined them together in his own spirit, he could then join them in 
his life [cf. AJ, p. 27]. As we can see, the eternal being is the one of childhood’s 
holy solitude, for “childhood’s day does not have a tomorrow” [SN, p. 119]. The 
feeling of eternity which Unamuno associates with childhood is particularly evi-
dent when he explains why he and his playmates did not feel signiicantly affected 
by the threat of death:
The child feels himself to be immortal; or rather, he is excluded from the issue of death and 
immortality: he feels himself to be eternal. He feels himself to be eternal because he lives entirely 
for the present moment. He hears a lot about death, perhaps sees people dying and kills animals, but 
he does not understand death. [RNM, p. 54−55]
With these words, Unamuno indicates that the child cannot form an idea of 
immortality until he is really able to relect upon the extinction of consciousness 
that death brings with it. Therefore, consciousness is ilimited for the child, with 
no memory of its beginning and with no suspicion for its end. And if we bear in 
mind that children’s consciousness has no limits, the concept of ‘consciousness’ 
becomes meaningless because it embraces everything and does not contrast with 
anything. Yet this situation varies dramatically as soon as the child is aware that he 
will sooner or later cease to exist, for the consciousness of oneself emerges when 
the individual realizes that his consciousness is limited [cf. STV, p. 167]. Indeed, 
Unamuno remarks that there is not any character as tragic as the child who cries 
in despair because he will inexorably grow old; but then he adds that it is even 
more tragic the situation of the child who is not aware that the will cease to exist, 
so that he can neither feel nor cry the tragedy of time: that child “cannot discover 
that he was born to die, because he is already dead” [ON, p. 169]. From this fol-
lows that, according to Unamuno, one can only feel really alive if he is aware that 
he will cease to exist; hence, if it is tragic to be aware of one’s own initude, it is 
even more tragic to live indeinitely unaware of our mortal condition. It should 
not be forgotten that Unamuno commends the state of the child who feels himself 
to be eternal and is alien to the consequences of death, for childhood is the age of 
innocence; but there comes a time when the child is aware that he as well as all 
his loved ones will die. Thus, Unamuno warns that the smiles of children should 
necessarily be followed by the tears of teens who become aware of their inevitable 
destiny. This means that, even though Unamuno praises and commends highly 
children’s state, he seems to regard the indeinite extension of this state not as 
a gift of God, but as the biggest tragedy.
An important aspect to take into account about the transition from kid’s age 
of innocence to the awareness of one’s own initude is the role of logic. Una-
muno perhaps exaggerates when he states that “what the child enjoys most is 
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breaking the rules of logic” [RNM, p. 46], yet such a statement constitutes a clear 
declaration of intentions. From his point of view, the child prodigy lacks child-
hood because he does his utmost to imitate adult behaviour, which makes his life 
a “monstrosity” [ON, p. 169]. After all, the child prodigy would not feel himself 
to be eternal, but would imitate among other things the solemnity shown by adults 
when someone dies, although this child knows nothing about death and, by ex-
tension, he does not even know what he is feigning. Unamuno regards “game as 
the child’s life” [RNM, p. 44], above all when it consists in breaking the rules of 
logic, for example when the child is delighted with the incongruousness of a song. 
In his opinion, those songs children recreate in their games constitute “the real tra-
dition”, for they are passed on from generation to generation without interference 
from adults and even before children learn to read and write, so that this tradition 
is felt more deeply and passed on more accurately than the written one [RNM, 
p. 45]. Whereas the pedagogue – understood as a pedantic educator strongly at-
tached to formal logic – fails to drive the child from the realm of aesthetics to the 
one of logic by substituting his nursery rhymes for “one of those things expressly 
written by adults and directed at children” including a moral at the end [APJ, 
p. 89], Unamuno boasts that no pedagogue might have entertained and drawn 
the attention of children like he did in his childhood when he improvised stories 
that did not make any sense [cf. RNM, p. 24−25]. In addition to the virgin words 
and with no sense which are used by children in their songs, Unamuno highlights 
that kids take delight in repeating the name of a thing in front of it: according to 
his own explanation, kids ind these repetitions very pleasurable because in this 
way they seem to spiritually appropriate the thing named [cf. RNM, p. 34]. Fur-
thermore, I add, the child spiritually appropriates the whole world: because when 
the child focuses his entire attention on that thing, he is also concentrating on all 
that constitutes the world for him at that particular moment. This is one of the 
many pleasures which can only be understood when childhood is still very close 
to one’s heart [cf. ON, p. 167]. Indeed, Unamuno presents the pedagogue as the 
stupid adult par excellence, for he is “unable to appreciate the merit and value of 
original silliness, whilst he has respect for stupid repetitions” [ON, p. 169]. Of 
course, these ‘stupid repetitions’ are the requirements placed on the kid to imitate 
as soon as possible the way in which adults reason and behave, even though this 
kind of imitation is as useless to measure creativity as the sterile series which must 
be completed in many intelligence tests.
From Unamuno’s standpoint, the genuine child who enjoys a long and inno-
cent childhood feels repulsion for logic due to his spirituality. In his own words, 
lies have often been regarded as sillier than bees, yet “bees are more logic − that 
is, more stupid – than lies, while lies are more aesthetic – that is, more spiritual 
– than bees” [RNM, p. 38]. In this vein, Baltasar Gracián [1996] had already 
contrasted ly’s bad taste with bee’s good taste, for the ly seeks the pestilent odor 





whilst the bee seeks fragrance in the very same garden. Unlike logical or rational 
character, the aesthetic and spiritual character contributes greatly to the develop-
ment of good taste. Indeed, Unamuno points out that the child is an artist from 
birth and ceases to be this when he becomes an adult; but if he is an adult artist, 
it is because he is still a child [cf. RNM, p. 44]. From here arises the question of 
which pedagogy Unamuno recommends to develop that “spirit’s childhood” he 
regards as the true “genius” [ON, p. 169]. Although Unamuno does not tackle 
this question in a systematic way, there are two remarks which may help us to 
answer it. On the one hand, he emphasizes that there is nothing more education-
al than “the truth for the sake of truth” [EI, p. 109], with which he places in the 
foreground the acceptance of things as they are, without external ornaments and 
without hidden essences. On the other hand, and to achieve such a thing, Una-
muno [APJ, p. 90] proposes “to defend the autonomy of games” in the face of 
pedagogues like Eugeni d’Ors, who argue for contemplating schools as the irst 
place in which children must begin to be acquainted with work environments and 
individual virtue. As we can see, Unamuno does not make it suficiently clear 
what a ‘suitable pedagogy’ would consist of, but he shows in much more detail 
what pedagogy should no t  consist of. He accomplishes this task, above all, by 
showing how Avito Carrascal, the protagonist of his novel Amor y pedagogía, 
adheres strictly to the principles and theories of scientiic pedagogy, to the extent 
that he says this in an absurd mealtime conversation: “Take any child, I mean, take 
it from its embryonic stage, apply sociological pedagogy to it, and the result will 
be a genius” [AP, p. 24].
Avito’s exorbitant narcissism leads him to make a peculiar use of science in 
order to ind a wife, conceive a child with her, and educate him not from birth but 
from the very conception of the baby. Whenever Avito is ruled by his instincts, 
he repeats to himself that “love and pedagogy are incompatible” [AP, p. 44−45], 
for he is completely convinced that instincts and feelings must be kept at bay by 
reason and science. Bearing this in mind, it is no surprise that Avito gets desperate 
when he sees how his son Apolodoro creates words that do not make any sense, 
and it is also no wonder that Avito loses his temper when his master Don Fulgen-
cio replies to him:
Don’t you remember when you were a child? Don’t you carry a child in 
your soul? Do you want to be a pedagogue without having been a child? A peda-
gogue who doesn’t remember his childhood! A pedagogue whose childhood isn’t 
close to his heart! Pedagogue! We can approach children only with our childhood. 
[AP, p. 60]
It is dificult for Avito to listen from his master that he should allow his son 
to play what he pleases, for “the terrible hour of logic will come sooner or later” 
[AP, p. 60]. Avito cannot assimilate that his son loves the absurd, and that all those 
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who tried to compose songs for children by following the cannons of logic and 
reason failed in the end; but he goes on with his task even though he recognizes 
the dificulty of solving all problems through pedagogy when Apolodoro admits 
not to know “how to want” [AP, p. 69]. Once Apolodoro becomes an adult, he 
suffers the consequences of his father’s pedagogy. After having published with 
great enthusiasm a short novel, Apolodoro listens how Don Fulgencio tells him 
that art is despicable and that good taste is even more despicable [cf. AP, p. 103]. 
Furthermore, Apolodoro asks his father whether it would be possible to develop 
pedagogy from love itself [cf. AP, p. 117]; yet despite Apolodoro ends up com-
mitting suicide straight after he laments over his father’s pedagogy, Avito then 
plans to educate his maid’s son “in accordance with the most strict pedagogy”, 
without admitting interference of love, masters or the company of other children 
[AP, p. 133], for Avito is sure that it was these very factors that altered the effects 
of sociological pedagogy to the extreme of causing his son’s suicide. This is how 
Unamuno illustrates the inlexibility of the pedagogue blinded by the absolute and 
unconditional priority he gives to scientiic knowledge over any evidence.
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that Unamuno exaggerates when he caricatures the excess-
es of the pedagogue obsessed with being faithful to scientiic knowledge, cost 
what it may. As París [1989, p. 276] rightly says, Unamuno idealizes childhood 
by contrasting it with scenarios in which prevail anguish and disappointment. This 
idealization, however, helps to show more clearly his conception of what peda-
gogy should be and what it should not be. The suitable pedagogy does not hinder 
parental love and decidedly encourages spontaneous games, with which it helps 
the child to appropriate the whole world by inviting him to lose himself in the 
world and to blend with it. If childhood is still close to the adult’s heart, the only 
thing he can do in order to revitalize and to renew himself is to evoke that child he 
carries in his soul. Not in vain, Unamuno [ON, p. 169] points out that “the noblest 
task is to search into oneself one’s own childhood and to lament having left it”. 
Therefore, the adult who had a genuine childhood – that is, a long childhood full 
of spontaneous games and illusions – will be in a better position to perceive the 
difference between his adult state and his childhood than the individual who did 
not enjoy a genuine childhood. But if we bear in mind that this pedagogy makes it 
easier for the adult to perceive more clearly what he is and what he has ceased to 
be, it can be concluded that such pedagogy is tragic. Whereas the world appears to 
blend with the child, the adult perceives the world as something that is somewhat 
distant because he has much clearer the difference between what he is and what he 
is not. At irst sight, this contrast appears to give rise to nothing more than extreme 





disquiet, so that it seems neither advisable nor necessary. Nevertheless, the mere 
fact of having a clearer consciousness of what one is now and of what one has 
ceased to be makes it easier for the individual to feel, so to say, more alive than the 
subject who has always let himself be guided by inertia and without hardly having 
experienced the contrast between the extremes Unamuno opposes to each other: 
to blend with the world and to realize the impact of the loss of such blend. And the 
more alive one feels, the more deeply he can cry the tragedy of necessarily ceasing 
to exist. As regards the unsuitable pedagogy illustrated by Avito’s excesses, it also 
encourages tragedy, but in a different way. This pedagogy becomes tragic because 
the desire that children become reasonable and logical adults as soon as posible 
reaches such an extreme that it receives total priority over their emotional and af-
fective development. According to Blanco [1994, p. 136], every action is imbued 
with tragedy because whenever one acts, he is choosing one option and discarding 
deinitively other possibilities; in the future, of course, new possibilities will arise, 
but they will no longer be the previous ones. Keeping this in mind, it is evident 
that the unsuitable pedagogy is tragic because it does not allow the child to enjoy 
a genuine childhood by creating songs which make no sense and playing what he 
pleases, absurd though it might seem. Later, the adult may pretend that he com-
poses songs with no sense and that he accompanies children’s games; yet if he 
neither created nor played spontaneously in his childhood, as an adult he might 
at most pretend to be doing it. The adult who devoted his childhood above all to 
imitate, will hardly have experienced just what he now wants to recreate: he can 
simply imitate it once again. Worst of all, he cannot carry out the most heroic act 
that can be expected: “to know how to make oneself ridiculous without linching” 
[STV, p. 309].
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SUMMARY
The present article seeks to describe the main lines of what Unamuno regarded as an adequate 
pedagogy for the child to enjoy a genuine and long childhood, which makes it easier for him to be-
come a man of intense interior life and great historical value, provided that such childhood remains 
close to his heart. To show more clearly what a suitable pedagogy for Unamuno would consist of, it 
will also be explained why he considered an excessive submission to scientiic pedagogy as perni-
cious for children’s development.
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